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ABSTRACT
States have long relied on the doctrines of unconscionability and public policy to protect individuals against unfair terms in mandatory arbitration provisions.
The Supreme Court recently struck a blow to such efforts in AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. In those
two cases, the Court established that a challenge to the enforceability of unfairly
one-sided arbitration clauses is preempted if it would interfere with "fundamental
attributes of arbitration." Several commentators have argued that these decisions
will dramatically alter the arbitration landscape, by wiping away virtually any
contract defense to the validity of an arbitration agreement and giving corporations carte blanche to impose whatever terms they want into an arbitration clause.
Many practitioners are aggressively pushing courts to take a similarly broad reading of Concepcion and Italian Colors.
This article takes a contrary view. First, this article argues that the cases will
have very little impact outside of the context of class action waivers, the subject
matter of both Concepcion and Italian Colors. Applying state law to strike down
arbitration provisions that are so one-sided as to be unconscionable ordinarily will
not interfere with "fundamental attributes of arbitration" and should not be
preempted.
Second, the Court's newfound focus on "fundamental attributes of arbitration" reveals why Concepcion should actually narrow the scope of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preemption rather than expand it. A careful examination of
arbitration clauses shows that, if anything, the "fundamental" aspect of arbitration
is choice, that is, the ability of parties to freely negotiate the terms of their arbitration agreements in an arms-length fashion. If choice is fundamental to arbitration,
then what is inconsistent with arbitration is a lack of choice, namely adhesion. As
a result, states have much greater power than previously thought to ensure fairness
in standard-form, non-negotiable adhesion contracts, in which most arbitration
agreements are contained, without violating the FAA.

* Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University School of Law. B.A. 1997, Yale University; J.D.
2001, Yale Law School. An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the Pound Civil Justice
Institute's 2014 Forum for State Appellate Court Judges. I would like to thank Myriam Gilles, Jeff
Sovern, Nancy Welsh, Jill Gross, Jim Rooks, Mary Collishaw, and Leslie A. Bailey for thoughtful
feedback and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts is an enormously controversial issue. The growth of mandatory arbitration
clauses has spawned widespread academic commentary, as well as repeated congressional, federal agency, and state legislative hearings, regarding whether arbitration clauses are fair or whether they unjustly deprive individuals of the ability
to seek redress for legal wrongs committed against them.1
At the heart of this debate is whether the doctrines of unconscionability and
public policy may be used to protect against unfair or overreaching arbitration
clauses. For plaintiffs challenging a defendant's attempt to move a dispute from
court to arbitration, raising an unconscionability or public policy defense is often
the primary vehicle to invalidate the arbitration clause.2 The question of whether
these defenses can be applied, and if so to what degree, to arbitration clauses is an
important one because the answer often determines whether or not the plaintiffs
dispute is heard in any forum. In many cases, the result of declaring an arbitration
clause enforceable is not that the dispute simply shifts from a judicial to an arbitral
forum, but that because of the constraints written into the arbitration clause, the
dispute is never heard at all.3
The U.S. Supreme Court appeared to strike a blow against the use of unconscionability and public policy defenses in two major cases involving the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration clauses: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-5
cepcion4 (Concepcion) and American Express Co. v.Italian Colors Restaurant
(Italian Colors). In Concepcion, the Supreme Court found that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted California's application of its unconscionability
doctrine to invalidate an arbitration clause's class action waiver because, in its
view, requiring class wide arbitration "interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA." 6 In Italian Col
ors, the Court applied Concepcion to require enforcement of an arbitration
clause's class action waiver in a federal antitrust action, even if the waiver made it
impossible for the plaintiffs to vindicate their rights under the Sherman Act.7
1. See, e.g., Thomas v. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration,2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1311
(noting that 139 bills designed to limit or regulate arbitration have been introduced in Congress since
1995); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitrationand Fairness,84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 124951 (2009) (describing the "fifteen-year academic debate" regarding the fairness of arbitration and
documenting the rise in Congressional hearings and legislative proposals to amend the Federal Arbitration Act).
2. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of FederalArbitrationLaw, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1439-41 (2008) (documenting the increased
prevalence of unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses as the Supreme Court has cut off
other avenues for challenging the enforceability of arbitration clauses); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194-96
(2004) (describing how unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses have increased and have
become a central way for defeating arbitration agreements).
3. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee On the ArbitrationFairness Act of 2013 (AFA) /S.878/H.R. 1844] 7 (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/12-17-13GillesTestimony.pdf (explaining that the purpose of mandatory arbitration
provisions is not to provide an alternate forum but to "provide a way to suppress and bury claims").
4. 131 S. Ct. 1740(2011).
5. 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
6. 131 S.Ct. at 1748.
7. 133 S. Ct. at 2310-12.
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Although both Concepcion and Italian Colors involved class action waivers,
commentators have predicted that the cases will have broad ripple effects into
other areas and will have "a revolutionary effect on the continuing viability of
state and federal arbitration regulations." 8 A number of scholars have suggested
that Concepcion's holding that the FAA can preempt state unconscionability doctrine and its focus on "fundamental attributes" of arbitration means that the FAA9
preempts most, or even all, unconscionability challenges to arbitration provisions.
Defense-oriented organizations are advising defense lawyers "to be very bullish"
in pushing Concepcion well beyond the class action context in order "to enforce

arbitration clauses in general,"10 and courts already have cited the two cases more
than one thousand times.11

This article takes a contrary view, and argues that the reports of the death of
unconscionability as applied to arbitration clauses are vastly overstated. Rather, a
close reading of Concepcion and Italian Colors show (1) that both cases should
have almost no effect on arbitration clauses outside of the context of class actions,
and (2) that the Court's focus on "fundamental attributes of arbitration" may,
counter-intuitively, provide grounds for narrowing FAA preemption rather than
expanding it.
As to the first point, most of the provisions in arbitration clauses that are likely to be considered unconscionable, such as provisions shortening statutes of limitations, limiting damages liability, and establishing biased arbitrator selection
mechanisms, do not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration and are not
preempted. There is nothing about the nature of arbitration that requires dramatically shortening a statute of limitations from a matter of years to a matter of days,
insulating a party from liability for punitive damages, or giving one side unilateral
control over arbitrator selection.
As to the second point, when taken at its word, Concepcion should limit FAA
preemption by greatly increasing the authority of courts and state legislatures to
regulate arbitration clauses through both common-law and statutory law. While
Concepcion established that the touchstone for FAA preemption is whether a state

8. Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing Viability of
Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 408 (2013); David Horton, FederalArbitration Act
Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1243-44 (2013) (describing
how some judges have interpreted Concepcion as "spilling over" into areas of unconscionability other
than class action waivers).
9. See, e.g., Sura & DeRise, supra note 8, at 407-08; Jacob Johnson, Barras v. BB&T: Charting a
Clear Path to Apply Concepcion Through A Quagmire of DivergentApproaches, 64 MERCER L. REV.
591, 596 (2013) ("The Court's decision in Concepcion 'dramatically diminished' the use of unconscionability as a meaningful method of avoiding arbitration.") (citation omitted); Stephen E. Friedman,
A Pro-CongressApproach to Arbitration and Unconscionability, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 53,
53-54 (2011) ("While Concepcion sanctions the continued theoretical applicability of unconscionability to arbitration provisions, it leaves very little room for actual application of the doctrine."); Thomas
J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the
Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323, 380 (2011) ("In the wake of Concepcion, one wonders what if anything is left of the doctrine of unconscionability in the realm of arbitration agreements."). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After Concepcion, 35 BERK. J.
OF EMP. & LABOR L. 153, 154 (2014) (arguing that some courts have interpreted Concepcion more
narrowly than scholars first predicted).
10. Jamie Boyer and Liz Kramer, Beyond Class Actions: Courts Hold State Anti-Arbitration Decisions are Preempted, 56 No. 5 DRI FOR DEE. 26 (2014).
11. As of January 13th, 2015, Westlaw shows that Concepcion has been cited in 1,111 cases and
Italian Colors has been cited in 146 cases, though there is undoubtedly some overlap between the two.
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rule interferes with "fundamental attributes of arbitration," the Court never defined that term. When actually examined, it appears that very few, if any, procedures are "fundamental." Arbitration is not a monolithic concept." Parties design
their arbitration systems in myriad different ways; there is no one specific procedure or format that is universal to arbitration. That parties adopt different approaches for different disputes shows that the characteristic that is truly fundamental to arbitration is the concept of fairly negotiated private choice. The essence of arbitration, if there is one, is that parties can freely and fairly negotiate to
adopt their own terms of dispute resolution rather than being subject to the fixed
and immutable rules of public litigation.
As a result, what truly interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration
is the lack of free and fair negotiation-i.e. adhesion. And most arbitration clauses, at least in the consumer and employment arenas, are embedded in adhesive
contracts. This is not to say that arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion
should be categorically unenforceable. Even Concepcion recognizes that "the
times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long
past."13 But, what it does mean is that if Concepcion is really to be taken at its
word, state regulation of adhesion contracts, or of arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts, is not preempted because adhesion contracts necessarily fall outside of the fundamental essence of arbitration.1 4 Thus, the most honest reading of
Concepcion is that, outside of the class action context, the FAA does not preempt
application of state law to arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.15
Part I reviews and describes the FAA preemption doctrine from the Concepcion and Italian Colors decisions. Part II conducts a close reading of those decisions' new articulation of a "fundamental attributes of arbitration" standard for
FAA preemption. The article distills four principles from Concepcion that indicate why it should have a narrow impact on unconscionability and public policy
defenses rather than a broad one. Part III then applies those four principles on
various types of terms in arbitration provisions that trigger unconscionability challenges and suggests that Concepcion's reasoning counsels against a finding that
the FAA preempts such unconscionability challenges in most cases. Part IV considers what should constitute the "fundamental" aspect of arbitration and concludes that, if anything, it is the concept of non-adhesive, freely negotiated choice.
12. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
13. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
14. Other scholars have presented persuasive cases that Concepcion should not be interpreted as
broadly preempting unconscionability or public policy defenses, for different reasons than those presented here. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 8, at 1255, 1265-72 (arguing that Concepcion's shift away
from a textual analysis of FAA preemption in favor of a purposivist analysis means that the FAA
should only preempt rules that "unjustifiably disfavor arbitration," i.e., that regulate arbitration for no
reason other than inherent suspicion of arbitration); Hiro N. Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
and the Antidiscrimination Theory of FAA Preemption, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 39 (2012)
(asserting that Concepcion highlights how FAA preemption should be viewed through the lens of
antidiscrimination theory and thus should only preempt rules that illegitimately discriminate against
arbitration).
15. To be sure, Concepcion involved an adhesion contract, and the Court still found that the FAA
preempted California's application of unconscionability to the contract. However, it did so because it
found that class action procedures would interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration, regardless
of whether the class action waiver was inserted into an adhesion contract or a negotiated contract. But
that does not mean that the FAA would preempt other adhesion contracts that do not contain class
action waivers. See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
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As a result, adhesion contracts, in which one party lacks meaningful choice over
arbitration terms, are anathema to fundamental principles of arbitration and thus
may be freely regulated by states without risking federal preemption.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS IN CONCEPCION AND
ITALIAN COLORS

To appreciate Concepcion's and Italian Colors's implications for arbitration
law, it is useful to place them in the context of the law of federal preemption.
There are two main types of preemption: express and implied. 16 Because the FAA
has no express preemption provision, the statute preempts state law through implied preemption. 7 Under implied "obstacle" preemption, the FAA preempts
state rules that interfere with or stand as an obstacle to achievement of the Act's
purposes. 18 However, where the issue touches an area of traditional state regulation, whether a state rule interferes with the FAA must be determined against the
backdrop of the presumption against federal preemption. 19 Consumer and employee protection is an area of traditional state regulation and thus the presumption against 20preemption should apply to most consumer and employment arbitration matters.
The FAA's primary purpose was to place arbitration clauses on "equal footing" with other contracts." Because the FAA was designed to overcome the prior
"judicial hostility" to arbitration reflected in judicial refusal to enforce arbitration
clauses simply because they were arbitration clauses, the statute has been interpreted to preempt state laws or rules that single out arbitration clauses for unfavorable treatment. Thus, a law that explicitly prohibits arbitration of a specific
type of claim is preempted,22 as is a law "that takes its meaning precisely from the
fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue."23
At the same time, the FAA expressly preserves generally applicable state-law
contract principles from preemption. Section 2 of the Act states that arbitration
clauses shall be enforceable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
16. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). There also is a less prevalent form of
preemption known as "field" preemption. Id.
17. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
18. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
19. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) ("In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an
intention clear and manifest." (internal quotation omitted)).
20. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Because consumer
protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling evidence of an intention to
preempt is required in this area.").
21. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002) ("The FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts .... "); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n.12 (1967) ("[T]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.").
22. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (stating that "[w]hen state
law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim," that rule is preempted by the FAA).
23. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492, n.9 (1987); see also Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (holding that the FAA preempted West Virginia's rule prohibiting
enforcement of arbitration clauses in tort and wrongful death claims against nursing homes); Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (holding that the FAA preempted a Montana law
requiring arbitration clauses, but not other contractual provisions, to be underlined and to appear on the
first page of the contract).
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for the revocation of any contract., 24 This includes contract doctrines like unconscionability and public policy defenses.25 Thus, prior to Concepcion, it had been
widely understood that the FAA does not
26 preempt generally applicable contract
law principles such as unconscionability.
A. Concepcion

In Concepcion, the Supreme Court altered that traditional understanding of
FAA preemption. It established for the first time that even generally applicable
contract doctrines will be preempted if they interfere with the "fundamental attributes of arbitration," a term the Court introduced for the first time but never
defined. In that case, the Court found that the FAA preempted California's application of its generally applicable unconscionability doctrine to invalidate an
arbitration clause's class action waiver on the ground that requiring classwide
arbitration would interfere with arbitration's fundamental attributes.28
Concepcion concerned a putative class action against AT&T Mobility alleging that AT&T advertised free phones but in fact charged customers $30 in sales
tax. 29 AT&T moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained in the customers' purchase agreements.30 Moreover, although the litigation
was filed as a class action, AT&T sought to compel each injured consumer to
arbitrate individually, based on the arbitration clause's ban on joint or class action
proceedings. 31 The consumers contended that the arbitration clause's class action
waiver was unconscionable because each consumer's individual damages were so
small to make individual arbitration infeasible.32 In essence, the consumers contended, the class action waiver served as a functional immunity provision for
AT&T because no reasonable person would arbitrate on an individual basis.
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and struck down the class action
waiver as unconscionable, relying on the California Supreme Court's holding in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court3 3 that class action bans in adhesive contracts are
unconscionable when applied to small dollar claims.34 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.35 It rejected AT&T's argument that the FAA preempted California's Dis
cover Bank rule, holding that the rule was simply an application of California's
general contract doctrine of unconscionability. 36 The court also noted that because the Discover Bank rule applied equally to class action waivers in arbitration
clauses and in other contracts, the rule placed arbitration clauses on the "exact
same footing" as other contracts.37
24. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
25. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (including unconscionability in a list of generally-applicable
contract doctrines that can be applied to invalidate arbitration clauses).
26. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 8, at 1229-30.
27. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1744.
30. Id. at 1744-45.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1745.
33. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
34. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2014/iss2/3

6

Frankel: Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why Unconscionability Survives the

No. 2]

Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion

The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged the
"equal footing" principle and specifically articulated that the FAA permits
"agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud duress, or unconscionability."' 38 At the same time, the Court
noted that while generally applicable contract defenses ordinarily are not preempted, "the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine normally thought to be
generally applicable, such as duress, or as relevant here, unconscionability, is
alleged to have been applied in a manner that disfavors arbitration. ' 9 Thus, the
Court indicated that generally applicable contract defenses could be preempted
where they "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives. 40
The Court held that the Discover Bank rule was preempted on the ground that
"requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA. 41
The Court was less clear about what precisely constitutes the "fundamental attributes" of arbitration. In several places in the opinion, it focuses on choicespecifically, each party's ability to freely negotiate their own rules so as to allow
for "efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute." 42 At other
points, it mentions various procedural outcomes, ranging from efficiency, greater
procedural flexibility, arbitrator expertise, quicker resolution, lower cost, and
finally, just general "informality. 43
Although the Court did not clearly identify what constituted "fundamental attributes" of arbitration, it is clear that the majority determined that whatever those
attributes might be, classwide arbitration ran afoul of them. Indeed, the Court has
seemed especially troubled by the prospect of classwide arbitration, much more so
than any other procedural constraint on arbitration. The Court has addressed
classwide arbitration in some form four different times since 2010 (and just granted certiorari in another arbitration case involving a class action waiver), and in
each decision emphasized how severely classwide arbitration deviates from the
majority's conception of traditional arbitration. 44 This is virtually unprecedented.
In the past, the Court has not expressed the opinion that any particular procedural
device was incompatible with arbitration. To the contrary, the Court's default

38. Id. at 1746.
39. Id. at 1747.
40. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1749; see also id. at 1748 (describing the FAA's purpose as "ensur[ing] the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings").
43. Id. at 1749 (stating that the purpose of allowing discretion in creating arbitration procedures is
"efficient, streamlined proceedings"); id. at 1750-51 (referring to procedural formality, having the
ability to choose arbitrators with subject-matter expertise, informality, and speediness).
44. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans, LLC v.
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (holding that the trial court did not err in confirming arbitrator's decision to allow classwide arbitration); id. at 2071-72 (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing discomfort with
classwide arbitration procedures); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (holding that arbitrators exceeded their authority in ruling that the
parties' arbitration agreement permitted classwide resolution). The Court also just granted certiorari to
decide whether a contract that references state law is governed by state law or the FAA in determining
whether a class action waiver in an arbitration clause is enforceable. DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, No.
14-162, S. Ct., 2015 WL 1280237 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015).
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presumption has been that it is up to the arbitrator to determine which procedural
45
mechanisms the parties intended to apply to their arbitration proceedings.
Additionally, the Concepcion Court engaged in an extensive discussion of
why it viewed class procedures as fundamentally incompatible with arbitration.
The Court's primary concern was that classwide arbitration would theoretically
bind absent class members, which raised significant questions about the arbitrator's authority over absent parties. 46 The Court also noted that (a) classwide arbitration limited each party's ability to choose subject-matter experts as arbitrators
because they would need an arbitrator who was capable of addressing class certification questions; (b) that classwide arbitration sacrifices "informality" and "requires procedural formality" in order to protect absent parties; (c) that classwide
arbitration is much slower than individual arbitration and will take a long time to
get to final judgment, and (d) that class actions involve greater risks to defendants,
who would be unlikely to agree to take such a risk, especially given the limited
appellate review of arbitrator decisions. 4' Based on its extended analysis of the
specific ways in which it viewed class procedures as incompatible with arbitra48
tion, the Court held that the FAA preempted California's Discover Bank rule.
Justice Thomas wrote a brief concurrence. He acknowledged that under the
majority opinion, unconscionability and public policy defenses remained viable
avenues for challenging arbitration clauses. 49 While expressing his disapproval of
the doctrine of obstacle preemption upon which the majority relied, Justice Thomas read the text of the FAA to permit challenges only to the formation of an arbitration agreement, not challenges to the agreement's
validity, such as challenges
50
based on unconscionability and public policy.

B. Italian Colors
Other than reaffirming that courts ordinarily should enforce class action
waivers, even where doing so would prevent a plaintiff from vindicating federal
statutory rights, Italian Colors does not add significantly to the doctrine of FAA
preemption. Italian Colors, which involved a claim under the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act,51 was not a preemption case. The crux of its holding was that opponents of class action waivers could not use federal law to accomplish what they
could not do under state law, namely, invalidate a class action waiver.52 In Italian
Colors, the plaintiffs attempted to apply a "judge-made" doctrine under which
45. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (holding that whether an arbitration clause authorized classwide arbitration was a question for the arbitrator rather than for the court);
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (holding that procedural questions
about the structure of arbitration generally are questions for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance,
while "gateway" questions pertaining to the arbitrability of the dispute are presumptively for the court
to decide in the first instance).
46. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750; see also Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2071-72 (Alito, J., concurring)
(raising concerns about whether an arbitrator can bind absent parties).
47. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-52; accordStolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685-87 (expressing similar
concerns about how class procedures may cause "fundamental changes" to the nature of arbitration).
48. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
49. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 1753-56.
51. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
52. Id. at 2312 (holding that "[t]he FAA does not sanction such a judicially created superstructure"
as would arise from classwide arbitration).
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courts would not enforce an arbitration clause that prevented a party from effectively vindicating federal statutory rights.53 The Court rejected that doctrine as
applied to class action waivers. As in Concepcion, the Court was concerned with
how the class device disrupted the nature of arbitration, particularly through the
effects on absent class members. It explained that the result in Italian Colors was
virtually compelled by Concepcion, stating that "[t]ruth '5 to
4 tell, our decision in
AT&TMobility [v. Concepcion] all but resolves this case."

As it did in Concepcion, the Court took care to indicate that other non-classaction-based public policy defenses remained viable, noting that the FAA might
still permit invalidation of certain unfair provisions outside the class action arena,
such as provisions providing for "filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable."55 Thus, Italian Colors simply reaffirmed that the Supreme Court viewed class procedures as
incompatible with arbitration. It followed Concepcion's view of FAA preemption, but did not change or expand it. 6 Because Italian Colors is not directly
about preemption, this article focuses more heavily on Concepcion, which was a
preemption case.
C. Conclusion

Although Concepcion and Italian Colors have seemed like dramatic opinions
because of their implications for class actions, their reach outside of the class action context may be narrower than first predicted. While they undoubtedly have
exerted a significant impact on class action waivers,57 it is far from clear that they
will have, or should have, an effect on other fact-specific unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses. The next section attempts to distill some critical
principles of Concepcion and Italian Colors in order to explain why they should
not have a broad effect beyond class actions.
II. TAKEAWAYS FROM CONCEPCION AND ITALIAN COLORS
Boiled down, Concepcion stands for the proposition that the FAA does not
preempt state unconscionability or public policy defenses as a general matter, but
that it only preempts such defenses when they impose rules that are incompatible
with fundamental attributes of arbitration or that are aimed at destroying arbitration. Because most fact-specific applications of state unconscionability principles
do not run afoul of those criteria, they ordinarily will not be preempted. The following four principles derived from Concepcion underscore why Concepcion does
not mandate preemption of all unconscionability and public policy challenges to
53. Id. at 2310.
54. Id. at 2312.
55. Id. at 2310-11 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
56. See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 208-11 (Cal. 2013) (explaining that
Italian Colors does not change the analysis of FAA preemption or expand the holding of Concepcion),
cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014).
57. See, e.g., Christine Hines and Ellen Taverna, PUBLIC CITIZEN, CASES THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN:
THREE YEARS AFTER AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION, CLAIMS OF CORPORATE WRONGDOING

CONTINUE TO PILE UP 3-4 (April 2014), http://www.citizen.org/documents/concepcion-thirdanniversary-corporate-wrongdoing-forced-arbitration-report.pdf
(identifying 140 class actions that
have been stopped from going forward because of Concepcion and Italian Colors).
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arbitration clauses, and why there remain plenty of areas of state law that will still
apply to arbitration clauses.
A. Unconscionabilityis Still Alive
Although some commentators initially predicted that Concepcion would lead
to the preemption of all unconscionability or public policy challenges to arbitration clauses,58 it is clear that the Court did not intend such a broad reading. First,
the Court expressly identified unconscionability as one type of generally applicable doctrine of state contract law that can be used to invalidate an arbitration
clause.5 9 Second, soon after Concepcion, the Supreme Court decided Marmet
Health Care Center,Inc. v. Brown, in which it held that the FAA preempted West
Virginia's categorical rule against enforcement of arbitration clauses to claims
against nursing homes and remanded the case for determination of whether the
arbitration clause was "unenforceable under state common law principles that are
not specific to arbitration and not pre-empted by the FAA. 60 If unconscionability
or public policy defenses were necessarily inconsistent with arbitration, that language would have been unnecessary. Likewise, in Italian Colors the dispute was
61
one of federal law and the parties did not raise state unconscionability doctrine.
Thus, the decision does not limit or undermine the applicability of state unconscionability principles.
Finally, if Concepcion established that all public policy challenges were
preempted, there would have been no need for Justice Thomas to write a concurrence, in contrast to the majority, stating that he would read the FAA to prohibit
virtually all public policy challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements.
Similarly, if the majority intended such a broad reading, it likely would have focused its opinion on public policy defenses in general instead of singling out the
specific implications and drawbacks of classwide arbitration procedures for such
extended discussion.
Consequently, as long as a state's "doctrine of unconscionability applies to
arbitration and to other agreements according to the same basic criteria," unconscionability will not disfavor arbitration and will not be preempted. 62 As a general
matter, unconscionability does not interfere with the FAA's goal of procedural
informality because unconscionability doctrine "determines enforceability of an
agreement not by whether it includes procedures that are inconsistent with arbitration's formality, but by examining the one-sidedness of its provisions and the

58. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
59. 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (stating that the savings clause in § 2 of the FAA "permits agreements to
arbitrate to be invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability,' but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue") (quoting Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996)).
60. 132 S.Ct. 1201, 1203-04 (2012).
61. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
62. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012); accordKilgore
v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that "Concepcion did not overthrow the common law contract defense of unconscionability" but instead "reaffirmed" it); see also
Elite Logistics Corp. v. Hanjin Shipping Co., No. 12-56238, 2014 WL 4654383, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept.
19, 2014) ("Insofar as an application of state substantive unconscionability rules do not discriminate
unfavorably against arbitration, they do not offend the FAA.").
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circumstances in which it was formed., 63 Thus, as explained below, many courts
have continued to address unconscionability
challenges to arbitration clauses after
64
both Concepcion and Italian Colors.
B. Class Actions Uniquely Implicate "Fundamental
Attributes ofArbitration"
It also appears, from reading Concepcion together with Italian Colors and the
Court's other recent arbitration opinions, that Concepcion was primarily concerned about classwide arbitration, not about unconscionability more generally.
As previously mentioned, the Court has shown an outsized concern about classwide arbitration and the procedures it entails. 65 It has addressed classwide arbitration four times since 2010.
The frequency with which the Court has addressed class arbitration contrasts
sharply with the way the Court has addressed other procedural rules relating to
arbitration. In fact, it has typically refused to address questions regarding the
appropriate procedural devices for arbitration, and has often concluded that the
arbitrator best decides such questions. 66 This reinforces the point that most questions of arbitration procedure, unlike class processes, are consistent with the fundamental attributes of arbitration. If such procedures were incompatible with
arbitration, it would be meaningless to say that arbitrators should address them
because there would be nothing to address.
Moreover, the Court's main concern in its classwide arbitration cases has always been the arbitrator's authority to bind absent class members, 6 which it discussed in several places in Concepcion, and how the complexities of class certification questions would hinder the parties' choice of arbitrators, issues which the
Court also has raised in other decisions. 68 These issues are unique to the class
action device and do not arise in other types of challenges to arbitration clauses.
The Court's repeated emphasis on the specific problems attendant to classwide
arbitration procedures, and particularly the problem of binding absent class members, suggests that classwide arbitration is sui generis. As explained in further
detail in Part III, infra, most other provisions in arbitration agreements that parties
have challenged, such as shortened statutes of limitations, damages restrictions,
biased arbitrator selection mechanisms, fee-shifting provisions, discovery restrictions, and confidentiality restrictions, do not implicate fundamental attributes
of arbitration.
63. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F.3d at 1278.
64. See infra Part III.
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
67. The concern about binding absent class members to a court judgment stems from due process
principles about a judgment that binds a non-party to a dispute. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shuts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (describing how binding absent class members can comport with due
process when certain safeguards are provided). That is different from binding a non-signatory to an
arbitration clause, something that courts routinely do. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, The Arbitration
Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 569-87 (2014) (describing certain situations in
which non-signatories will be bound to an arbitration clause). Those cases arise when parties try to
bind a non-signatory who is a party to the judicial action to the terms of the arbitration clause. This
does not raise the same due process concern.
68. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-52; accordItalian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312; Sutter, 133 S.
Ct. at 2071-72 (Alito, J., concurring); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685-87.
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C. Fact-SpecificApplications of Unconscionability Versus
CategoricalApplications of Unconscionability.
A third takeaway is that there is a difference between categorical rules declaring certain arbitration provisions unconscionable and fact-specific applications of
unconscionability to a particular arbitration provision under a particular set of
circumstances. From the Court's perspective, drawing a distinction between categorical rules and individualized assessment makes sense because categorical rules
69
have the potential to disfavor arbitration while fact-specific applications do not.
For example, a rule that all limitations on discovery render an arbitration clause
unconscionable without regard to whether the limitations in fact hindered the party in the case from obtaining necessary evidence would be a rule that disfavors
arbitration. It indicates that arbitration itself is unfair because it limits discovery.
As a result, that rule applies traditional unconscionability principles to arbitration
in a different manner than to other contracts by invalidating the discovery limitation even where the limitation did not create an unconscionable result. By contrast, a specific finding in a specific case that a discovery limitation was unconscionable because it was so onerous that it made it impossible for the plaintiff to
pursue a claim would be a valid application of unconscionability. It would treat
arbitration clauses just like other contracts and thus would not be preempted.
Nothing about that latter, case-specific rule disfavors arbitration. Rather, it
reinforces the point that arbitration clauses can limit discovery, though that limitation may become unenforceable in a particular case where the plaintiff meets his
or her burden of demonstrating unconscionability. Such a reading best harmonizes Concepcion's competing concerns about preserving generally applicable state
law while also preventing states from discriminating against arbitration agreements. 70 If fact-specific applications of unconscionability were preempted (outside of the class action context where fact-specific applications of unconscionability may be incompatible with fundamental attributes of arbitration), then the
Court's statements that unconscionability remains a valid ground for invalidating
arbitration clauses would be an empty letter.71
The examples of invalid restrictions on arbitration that the Concepcion Court
provided reinforce this distinction because each one involved a categorical rule.
Those examples included rules declaring arbitration clauses unenforceable if they
failed to provide for judicially monitored discovery, failed to require compliance
with the Federal Rules of Evidence, or failed to allow for disposition by a jury,

69. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747-48 (giving examples of categorical rules that sweep too broadly
and consequently disfavor arbitration).
70. See, e.g., Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492 (Mo. 2012) (holding that "Concepcion permits state courts to apply state law defenses to the formation of the particular contract at
issue on a case-by-case basis" and concluding that those defenses include generally applicable unconscionability principles); Schnuerle v. Insight Commc'ns, Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 580 (Ky. 2012)
(Schroder, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Supreme Court concluded that the Discover Bank rule 'interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.' Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. Such interference is not present when, as here,
a particular arbitration agreement is unconscionable under the unique facts of that particular case.").
71. See, e.g., Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 490-91 (Mo. 2012) (explaining that
if the FAA preempted all unconscionability defenses, then the Court's extended discussion of unconscionability as a viable ground for invalidating arbitration clauses would be superfluous).
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regardless of how those rules impacted a particular party in a particular case. 2
The Court noted that even though all could be considered generally applicable
principles, they would disfavor arbitration and exert a "disproportionate impact"
on arbitration agreements.7 3 Each of those examples involves a categorical rule
that foregoes consideration of whether such limitations, when applied to a particular case, would impede a party's access to arbitration and thus be unconscionable.
Accordingly, such categorical rules would have an overbroad effect by invalidating arbitration agreements that were not actually unconscionable. In this way,
such rules disfavor arbitration and are preempted.
Moreover, the Court seemed to treat the class action waiver at issue in Concepcion the same way. It noted that while California's Discover Bank rule was
ostensibly limited to particular circumstances, the conditions of the rule were so
broad and malleable that it would functionally apply to almost any class action,
even where there was evidence that the plaintiffs could individually litigate their
claim. The Court concluded that it was far from clear that the plaintiff lacked
incentive to individually litigate. It noted that the arbitration agreement provided
that if a claimant proceeded in individual arbitration and obtained an award greater than AT&T's last settlement offer, AT&T would pay a minimum of $7,500
plus twice the claimant's attorneys' fees. Both the district court and the Ninth
Circuit concluded that aggrieved plaintiffs had incentives to seek individual relief. 4 In other words, the Discover Bank rule was overbroad and applied even in
situations where the facts did not satisfy California's general unconscionability
principles. In that way, the rule treated arbitration clauses differently from other
contracts and thus impermissibly disfavored arbitration.
In one of the most thorough examinations of Concepcion, the California Supreme Court relied on this distinction to hold that the FAA does not preempt generally applicable unconscionability principles when applied in a fact-specific
manner so as not to disfavor arbitration. 5 It determined that, while the FAA
preempted California's rule that any contract, arbitration or otherwise, prohibiting
a wage and hour claimant from pursuing an administrative remedy known as a
"Berman Hearing" was unconscionable, the FAA did not preempt California's
unconscionability doctrine generally and did not preclude a court from holding
that a Berman waiver is unconscionable in a case where it prevented a claimant
from seeking redress.7 6 The California Supreme Court explained that the rule
"categorically prohibiting waiver of a Berman Hearing" would delay the onset of
arbitration and interfere with the goal of encouraging streamlined proceedings.7 7
However, the court then went on to hold that if the Berman waiver prevented the
plaintiff from vindicating his rights, the agreement could be unconscionable as a
matter of California law and would not be preempted. 8 It explained that this application of California's unconscionability would not impinge upon the fundamen-

72. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1753.
75. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2724
(2014).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 199.
78. Id. at 200-08.
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tal attributes of arbitration.7 9 Other courts have agreed that Concepcion is concerned with categorical rules that have an overbroad reach, not with
fact-specific
80
applications of generally applicable unconscionability principles.
This does not mean that a rule is automatically preempted whenever it has a
categorical impact. Rather, the concern is that categorical rules risk overbreadth-i.e. that they would invalidate arbitration clauses even when those claus-

es do not satisfy the traditional test for substantive unconscionability. As the provisions in arbitration agreements become increasingly restrictive or unfair, a categorical rule precluding their enforcement is less likely to be overbroad and to be
preempted. One could imagine an arbitration clause that reduced the statute of
limitations of bringing a claim from one year to one day. Such a clause would be
unconscionable in virtually every case, and it is doubtful that anyone would suggest that it would be preempted simply because a court might say that a one-day
statute of limitations is always unconscionable. There is nothing about a rule
barring one-day statutes of limitations that disfavors arbitration.
In short, the sensible reading of Concepcion is that unconscionability survives
when it is applied to arbitration in the same way that it is applied to other contracts. That ensures that unconscionability does not disfavor arbitration, and also
ensures that the doctrine is not eliminated altogether.

D. A DisproportionateImpact on Arbitration Clauses Will Not, Standing
Alone, Give Rise to FAA Preemption.
Some uncertainty has developed regarding whether the FAA preempts any
rule that has a "disproportionate impact"'81 on arbitration agreements. However,
the most sensible reading of Concepcion is that a disproportionate effect, standing
alone, is not enough to trigger FAA preemption. Rather, the rule must have a

79. Id. at 201-02 (discussing examples such as a provision requiring a $50,000 amount-incontroversy threshold for receiving a right to appeal an arbitration award, provisions limiting damages,
allowing only the drafting party to recover attorneys' fees, or a provision imposing prohibitively expensive costs, as ones that do not affect fundamental attributes of arbitration); see also Noohi v. Toll
Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 612-13 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that a rule requiring an arbitration agreement
be supported by independent consideration, irrespective of consideration in the rest of the contract,
does not undermine arbitration or treat it differently from other contracts).
80. Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enterp., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1203 (Wash. 2013) ("When Discover
Bank was applied in Concepcion, the rule, in essence, became an overbroad rule invalidating an arbitration clause that might otherwise be conscionable under California law. As our above analysis
shows, the arbitration clause at issue here contained numerous unconscionable provisions based on the
specific facts at issue in the current case."); Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 489-92
(Mo. 2012) (stating that Concepcion establishes that categorical rules which disfavor arbitration are
preempted, but that factually-specific applications of Missouri's unconscionability doctrine are not
preempted); Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 502 (2012) (distinguishing the
"categorical" Discover Bank rule from fact-specific unconscionability defenses in holding that an
arbitration clause which unreasonably limited the statute of limitations and failed to impose reciprocal
obligations on the parties was unconscionable and not preempted by Concepcion); Schnuerle v. Insight
Commc'ns, Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 580 (Ky. 2012) (Schroder, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The Supreme Court concluded that the Discover Bank rule 'interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.' Such interference is not
present when, as here, a particular arbitration agreement is unconscionable under the unique facts of
that particular case.") (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct 1740, 1748 (2011)).
81. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
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disproportionate effect in a way that disfavors arbitration or that interferes with
arbitration's fundamental attributes.
This uncertainty stems from the Concepcion Court's statement that categorical rules requiring litigation-style discovery and application of the Federal Rules
of Evidence to all arbitration proceedings would be preempted.82 The Court noted
that such rules are generally
applicable, but have "a disproportionate impact on
83
arbitration agreements."
Some commentators have suggested that this should mean that the FAA
preempts any rule that has a "disproportionate impact" on arbitration. 84 However,
that is an awkward and untenable reading of the decision. First, it is important to
remember that the Court's examples of preempted rules were limited to categorically overbroad rules that went beyond traditional unconscionability, and therefore
treated arbitration clauses differently from other
contracts, rather than all rules that
85
fell disproportionately on arbitration clauses.
Second, there are various types of rules that would have a disproportionate or
even exclusive effect on arbitration provisions, but that are not preempted. Consider a challenge to an arbitration provision that allows the drafting party to
choose the arbitrators and gives the opposing party no input into the selection
process, or any other arbitrator selection provision that gives rise to a substantial
risk of arbitrator bias. A rule invalidating such a provision as unconscionable will
necessarily have a disproportionate effect on arbitration clauses because the rule
involves arbitrator selection. Such a rule, however, does not conflict with the
FAA. 86 Rather, it is fully consistent with the FAA, which identifies "evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators" as a ground for vacating an arbitration
award. 8 Similarly, a rule that an arbitration provision requiring the parties to split
the costs of the arbitrator is unconscionable where it would make arbitration cost88
prohibitive would necessarily have disproportionate effect on arbitration clauses.
Virtually any provision that seeks to contract around litigation rules and procedures will have a disproportionate effect on arbitration, because such provisions
only come into play when parties bypass the litigation system and opt for some
form of private dispute resolution.
Consequently, several courts have refused to find that a disproportionate impact on arbitration clauses, standing alone, will automatically give rise to FAA
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Consumersfrom Significantly One-Sided Arbitration Clauses Within Contracts of Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 705 (2013)
("[S]tates may not alter the basic rules of contract in such a manner as to have a disproportionate
impact on the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.").
85. Id.
86. Chavarria v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that a rule ensuring
fairness in arbitrator selection will necessarily disproportionately affect arbitration "because the term is
arbitration specific" but holding that it is not preempted because it does not disfavor arbitration); In re
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F.3d 1269, 1277, n.10 (11 th Cir. 2012) (holding that a South
Carolina rule that requires arbitration to be "geared toward achieving an unbiased decision by a neutral
decision-maker" to be fully consistent with and not preempted by the FAA because the FAA similarly
seeks to ensure arbitrator impartiality).
87. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012).
88. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 201 (Cal. 2013) (giving example of an arbitration clause imposing prohibitive costs as one that is unrelated to fundamental attributes of arbitration),
cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014).
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preemption.8 9 The California Supreme Court recently held that "a facially neutral
state-law rule is not preempted simply because evenhanded application 'would
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.' 90 The court held that
a state-law rule91is preempted only when it "interferes with fundamental attributes
of arbitration."
Two recent Ninth Circuit decisions similarly demonstrate why a disproportionate impact, standing alone, is insufficient to give rise to FAA preemption. In
Mortensen v. Bresnan Communications, LLC, the Ninth Circuit found that the
FAA preempted a Montana rule declaring it against public policy for a contract to
include a waiver of fundamental rights when the waiver is not within the party's
reasonable expectations. 92 In finding the rule preempted, the court discussed how
the rule disproportionately affects arbitration clauses. 93 But the court subsequently clarified in a later decision that Concepcion "cannot be read to immunize all
arbitration agreements from invalidation, no matter how unconscionable they may
be, so long as they invoke the shield of arbitration. ' 94 Rather, the rule must be
"unfavorable to arbitration" to be preempted.95 Thus, the court found that a rule
protecting a party against biased arbitrator selection had a disproportionate impact
on arbitration but is not preempted because the rule does not disfavor arbitration;
it merely requires the arbitration process to be fair.9 6
Finally, the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a finding that a defendant's arbitration clause was unenforceable where it required plaintiffs to arbitrate their
claims, but placed no reciprocal obligation on the defendant-meaning the defendant was free to bring any affirmative claims it wanted in court. 9 The court
rested its decision on a Maryland contract rule requiring an arbitration clause be
supported by consideration, regardless of whether the contract as a whole has

89. See, e.g., Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 927; Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2013);
Brown v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948, 953 (Wash. 2013); Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa
Arena Blanca, LLC, 306 P.3d 480, 484-87 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
90. Id. (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct 1740, 1747 (2011)).
91. Id. at 201; see also Brown v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948, 953 (Wash. 2013) (rejecting
a "broad reading" of Concepcion and adopting a "narrower view" that generally applicable unconscionability principles are not preempted and that what the FAA instead preempts are "state rules
specific to arbitrationthat interfere with the purposes of the FAA.") (emphasis in original).
92. 722 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2013).
93. Id. at 1161. This does not mean that the FAA preempts every state-law doctrine requiring a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of fundamental rights. For example, many states have a
constitutional right to a jury trial that can be waived only if the waiver is knowing, voluntary and
intelligent. That constitutional right applies to any contract, not just arbitration clauses, and so is not
preempted. See, e.g., Siopes v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 312 P.3d 869, 892-96 (Haw. 2013)
(Acoba, J., concurring) (explaining that the plaintiffs were not required to arbitrate because their waiver of a jury trial was not knowing and voluntary under the Hawaii Constitution).
94. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013).
95. Id. (emphasis in original); accord Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App'x 692 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that arbitration agreement that had various unfair provisions was unconscionable and
concluding that this result "harmonize[d]" with Concepcion because the decision was not founded on
any policy unfavorable to arbitration but was "based on general California law respecting unconscionable contracts").
96. Chavarria,733 F.3d at 927; see also Smith v. JEM Group, Inc., 737 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding that FAA did not preempt finding that arbitration agreement in an attorney retainer agreement
was procedurally unconscionable because the rule did not affect the arbitration process or otherwise
single out arbitration for disfavor).
97. Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2013).
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consideration.98 The court noted that, while the Maryland rule "does single out an
arbitration provision in a larger contract," it was simply a specific application of
the general doctrine of consideration and thus was not preempted. 99 It also held
that a rule requiring reciprocal arbitration obligations does not disfavor
arbitration
100
but instead encourages arbitration by binding both parties to arbitrate.
This reasoning underscores that a disproportionate impact on arbitration
agreements is not determinative. Rather, the preemption question turns on whether the rule is incompatible with fundamental attributes of arbitration or singles out
arbitration disfavorably. While a disproportionate impact may be relevant to that
assessment in certain circumstances, it is not a justification for preemption on its
own.

Moreover, there may be several other reasons why a disproportionate effect
standing alone should not be a basis for invoking preemption. First, the language
of "disproportionate impact" is adopted from anti-discrimination law, but under
anti-discrimination law, disparate impact is the beginning of the story, not the end
of it. In the employment context, a disparate impact will be found nondiscriminatory if the employer has a legitimate justification for the practice that
gives rise to it and that justification is not pretextual.1 1 In other words, not all
rules that exert a disparate impact are unlawful. Only unjustified disparate impact
is unlawful. Analogizing to arbitration means that a rule that disproportionately
impacts arbitration clauses should not automatically be preempted. As other
scholars have argued, a rule should be preserved from preemption unless there is
no valid justification for the10rule
or the rule is just an attempt to intentionally dis2
criminate against arbitration.
Second, a disproportionate impact framework would have the odd result of
placing the scope of preemption into the hands of drafting parties. If more parties
put a particular provision in an arbitration clause, any rule finding that provision
unconscionable would be increasingly likely to create a disproportionate impact
on arbitration. Similarly, the expansion of the use of arbitration would make arbitration clauses more common and would give rise to disproportionate impact arguments when those clauses are challenged. In essence, such a rule would tie
preemption to what drafting parties choose to include or not include in their arbitration clauses. This seems to run directly counter to the Court's focus on the
fundamental attributes of arbitration-that is, those features essential to arbitration
regardless of the parties' intent. This further undermines the notion that disproportionate impact, standing alone, gives rise to FAA preemption.
At bottom, the fairest reading of Concepcion is that preemption occurs only
when a rule conflicts with arbitration's fundamental attributes or is specifically
aimed at destroying arbitration. As the next section addresses, most unconsciona98. Id. at 606-07.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 612-13; accord Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 306 P.3d 480, 48487 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (holding a non-mutual arbitration clause unconscionable and not preempted
by the FAA because the court was applying New Mexico's general contract law of unconscionability,
even if the particular manner in which it applied that doctrine pertained to an arbitration clause).
101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 424 U.S. 404 (1971).
102. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 14; Horton, supra note 8. Moreover, in anti-discrimination claims,
the disparate impact will not be assumed. Rather it is the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate disparate
impact, and they often must utilize detailed statistical analysis to meet their burden. See, e.g., Watson
v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 993-99 (1988) (discussing the plaintiffs evidentiary burden).
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bility challenges to the terms of arbitration provisions do not implicate fundamental attributes of arbitration and should not be preempted.
III. APPLYING CONCEPCION

What the above-described principles indicate is that Concepcion should not
be read as broadly preemptive of all or even most unconscionability defenses.
Consequently, it is important to be aware of the danger of reading Concepcion at a
level of generality so high-as many commentators have-that it would preempt
almost any challenge to an arbitration clause.10 3 Concepcion identifies some of
the perceived benefits of arbitration as including "lower costs, greater efficiency,
and speed," as well as "informality," and "the ability to choose expert adjudicators
to resolve specialized disputes."10 4 When read at a high enough level of abstraction, almost any restraint on what terms parties may place in an arbitration agreement can be seen as conflicting with those principles.1U3 One could say, for example, that rules requiring shortening a statute of limitations to two days is unconscionable conflicts with the goal of speedy dispute resolution; that rules requiring
mutuality of obligation-i.e. that both sides bind themselves to arbitrationarguably demand a level of formality by restricting a party's choices; that rules
finding particular discovery limitations unconscionable could be seen as conflicting with the goal of lower costs or decreased formality; and that rules against provisions insulating parties from punitive damages or other damages may be seen as
conflicting with the goal of lower costs. On some level, any restraint increases
formality, because it places a procedural restriction on the party's ability to set
whatever rules it likes for arbitration, no matter how one-sided those rules may be.
If increased formality were enough to give rise to preemption, then almost
every challenge is preempted and if so, there is nothing that would stop a drafting
party from writing an arbitration clause in a way that fully insulates itself from all
relief. Take the example of a provision shortening the statute of limitations. If the
FAA preempted any restriction on a party's ability to shorten a statute of limitations, on the ground that such a restriction interfered with the goal of speedier
dispute resolution, then nothing would prevent parties from reducing statutes of
limitations from three years to three days, or even one day. As one court noted,
even after Concepcion, "[f]ederal law favoring arbitration is not a license
10 6 to tilt
the arbitration process in favor of the party with more bargaining power."
The following section applies Concepcion to the terms of arbitration provisions that most commonly give rise to unconscionability or public policy challenges, and suggests that such provisions may be invalidated under state law without interfering with the FAA's purposes.

103. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
104. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct 1740, 1748 (2011).
105. See Sura & DeRise, supra note 8, at 447 ("At a high enough level of abstraction, unconscionability rules level the playing field between disputing parties of unequal bargaining power. Thus, there
is good reason to believe that, at least as those rules relate to arbitration, they will tend to result in more
process, not less. The flipside of that coin is that unconscionability rules tend to sacrifice efficiency,
and thus fall afoul of Concepcion'slogic.").
106. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013).
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A. Mutuality
Non-mutual arbitration clauses are ones where the drafting party requires the
opposing party to arbitrate all claims but reserves its own right to pursue affirmative claims in court. There is nothing fundamental to arbitration about a provision
that requires one side to forego its right to a judicial action and pursue arbitration,
but permits the other party to go to court. Thus, many courts have found that such
provisions can be struck down as unconscionable, even after Concepcion.10 7 If
anything, as the Fourth Circuit found, requiring
mutuality encourages arbitration
108
by giving both sides a reason to utilize it.

B. Damages Caps
Many courts have found that provisions precluding an arbitrator from awarding punitive damages or damages specifically authorized by statute can be struck
down as unconscionable or against public policy without creating preemption
concerns. 10 9 Although one might assert that damages caps help reduce costs and
107. Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding an arbitration clause that obligated one side to arbitrate but allowed the other to pursue all claims in court lacked consideration and
also was not preempted by the FAA); Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 536 F. App'x 600, 604 (6th
Cir. 2013) (holding an arbitration clause to be illusory and unenforceable for lack of consideration
where the plaintiff was required to arbitrate but where the "[d]efendant retained the ability to modify
any term of the contract, at any time"); Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 494-95 (Mo.
2012) (striking down arbitration clause that bound the consumer to individual arbitration but allowed
the Title Lender to go to court to bring repossession actions, and holding that the FAA did not preempt
its application of Missouri unconscionability law); Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca,
LLC, 306 P.3d 480 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (holding non-mutual arbitration clause unconscionable and
not preempted by the FAA); Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499-500 (2012)
(holding that while not every lack of mutuality would render an arbitration clause unconscionable, the
fact that the arbitration clause both (a) requires the employee to arbitrate all claims while allowing the
employer to bring claims for declaratory and injunctive relief to protect proprietary information in
court, and (b) "requires plaintiffs to pay any attorneys' fees incurred by Empire, but imposes no reciprocal obligation on Empire" was unconscionable and unenforceable under the facts of that case); Lou
v. Ma Labs., Inc., No. C-12-05409-WHA, 2013 WL 2156316, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (holding
arbitration clause substantively unconscionable where employer was authorized to bring claims for
injunctive relief in court but employee could not); McFarland v. Almond Bd. of California, No. 2:12CV-02778-JAM-CKD, 2013 WL 1786418, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) (holding arbitration
clause illusory where plaintiff was required to arbitrate but the defendant reserved the right to alter the
arbitration policy at any time, meaning defendant could "modify the agreement on the fly, picking and
choosing when the arbitration policy applies and when it does not"); see also Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow,
2014 Ark. 375 (2014) (treating lack of mutuality as evidence that a valid arbitration agreement was
never formed, and concluding that the FAA did not preempt its interpretation of state law). But see
THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding the FAA preempted a state rule that non-mutual arbitration clauses are unconscionable on the ground that such a view is
predicated on the assumption that arbitration is an inferior alternative to litigation).
108. Noohi, 708 F.3d at 612-13.
109. See, e.g., Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App'x 692, 692 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding
unconscionability in part because "the arbitration agreement limits damages otherwise available to
Newton under [the] statute"); Franks v. Bowers, 116 So.3d 1240 (Fla. 2013) (holding an arbitration
clause's limitation on damages violated the state's Medical Malpractice Act, and was therefore void as
against public policy); Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 798-99 (2012) (holding
substantively unconscionable an arbitration provision that precluded arbitrators from awarding special
or punitive damages, but permitted the corporate party to recover liquidated damages on top of other
damages); Zaborowski v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding unconscionable a provision barring arbitrators from awarding punitive damages). See also Brown
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therefore are fundamental to arbitration, that is not the case. First, the arbitration
goal of reducing costs refers to procedural costs, not the ultimate remedy the arbitrator might award. Supporters of arbitration assert that arbitration is more costeffective and efficient than litigation in the manner that proceedings are conducted, and the Concepcion Court's discussion of how the class certification process
would undermine the goal of a procedurally cost-effective arbitration process
reinforces that point.110
Second, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the default presumption is
that arbitrators are fully capable of addressing the same claims, and awarding the
same relief, as courts. One of the basic notions of arbitration is that it does not
require a party to forego any claims or remedies, but simply shifts the resolution
of those claims into a different forum.111 In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, the United States Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a New
York rule allowing courts to award punitive damages, but that barred arbitrators
from doing the same. 112 In that case, the Court took pains to construe an arbitration clause with a New York choice-of-law provision (thus incorporating the
above rule) to also incorporate otherwise applicable federal law, which it construed as authorizing an award of punitive damages. 1 3 In other words, the arbitrator's ability to award the same relief a judge might award is part of the basic
background fabric of arbitration. This does not mean that in every case the FAA
would preempt a rule limiting punitive damages, but it does show that limiting
punitive or other damages is in no way essential to arbitration.
C. Statute ofLimitations
Courts have found provisions greatly reducing the statute of limitations for
bringing a claim can be struck down as unconscionable or against public policy
without running afoul of the FAA. 114 There is no reason to think that a shortened
v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948, 955-56 (Wash. 2013) (refusing to find a bar on punitive
damages unconscionable where it remained unclear whether the plaintiff could still obtain statutory
double damages).
110. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct 1740, 1745 (2011).
111. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum").
112. 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995).
113. Id. at 59-61. Notably, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, which has served as a model for
many state arbitration statutes, authorizes arbitrators to award punitive damages. Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, § 21, 7 U.L.A. 60-61 (2003).
114. See, e.g., Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 308 P.3d 635 (Wash. 2013) (holding that significantly
shortened statutes of limitation in arbitration provision were unconscionable); Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enterp., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Wash. 2013) (striking down provision reducing statute of
limitations from several years to thirty days); Brown, 306 P.3d at 956 (Wash. 2013) (holding clause
reducing statute of limitations from three years to six months unconscionable); Potiyeviskiy, v. TM
Transp., Inc., No. 1-13-1864, 2013 IL App (1st) 131864-U, at *7-8 (Ill. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (holding arbitration provision's ten-day statute of limitations unreasonable as applied to the facts of the case
and unenforceable as a matter of generally applicable state law and not preempted by Concepcion);
Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 (2012) (holding an arbitration provision
limiting the statute of limitations to six months was unconscionable when considered in conjunction
with other unfair provisions in the arbitration clause); Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1153 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (holding six-month statute of limitations unconscionable as applied to plaintiffs Fair Labor
Standards Act claim in part, because in the employment context, "the cause of action may not be
discovered for a long period of time").
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statute of limitations is a fundamental feature of arbitration, especially where the
limitations period is so short to make it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to file a
timely claim.
D. "Loser Pays " Rules
Another type of provision that frequently is challenged as unconscionable is a
provision that requires the losing party to pay the other side's attorneys' fees and
costs, or that shifts fees in ways inconsistent with relevant statutes.115 Such provisions can be unconscionable because placing the risk of being held accountable
for the opposing party's attorneys' fees and costs on the financially weaker party
creates a significant disincentive for that party to pursue a claim. Courts have
noted that provisions bypassing statutory fee and cost-shifting provisions and
instead imposing loser-pays rules seem to be specifically designed "to impose
upon the
employee a potentially prohibitive obstacle to having her claim
1 16
heard."
Rules finding such provisions unconscionable in appropriate circumstances
do not undermine the goal of reducing costs.117 They merely shift the costs and
fees of arbitration from one party to the other. Thus, application of general contract principles to invalidate such provisions does not interfere with the FAA.
E. Fees and Costs
Arbitration provisions that make the arbitration process so onerous or expensive as to functionally deny access to the arbitral forum often give rise to unconscionability challenges. These provisions take any number of forms. They may
require the parties to split the costs of the arbitrators' fees in cases where those
115. Brown, 306 P.3d at 957-58 (holding fee-shifting provision inconsistent with state statutes substantively unconscionable); Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App'x 692 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable in part because "the arbitration agreement increases Newton's
potential liability for attorney's fees as compared to California's codified fee shifting regime"); Gandee, 293 P.3d at 1200-01 (striking down "loser pays" rule as unconscionable as applied to the plaintiff); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F.3d 1269, 1276-81 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding
arbitration provision that required a bank customer to bear all of the bank's costs, fees and expenses
incurred in connection with any dispute, regardless of which side prevails, was unconscionable); Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 799-800 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding provision which required employee to pay employer's attorneys' fees if the employer prevailed but did not
allow employee to collect attorneys' fees if she prevailed was non-mutual and also unconscionable
because it was inconsistent with state law prohibiting the employee from having to pay an employer's
attorneys' fees regarding certain claims); Lou v. Ma Labs., Inc., No. C-12-05409-WHA, 2013 WL
2156316, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (holding that an agreement allowing an arbitrator to allocate
attorney and arbitrator fees across one or both parties without providing guidelines for when the arbitrator would do so, was unconscionable as it created a significant disincentive for an employer to
pursue arbitration); Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (holding that fee-shifting provision had the
potential to make the plaintiff liable for fees in violation of relevant statutory law and thus was unenforceable); Winston v. Academi Training Center, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-767, 2013 WL 989999, at *2
(E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2013) (refusing to enforce arbitration provision that required plaintiffs to pay all
fees and costs even though the False Claims Act allows prevailing plaintiffs to collect attorneys' fees).
116. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir. 2013).
117. See, e.g., In re Checking Account, 685 F.3d at 1277-78 (holding that applying South Carolina's
generally applicable unconscionability doctrine to invalidate a contractual fee-shifting provision did
not "interfere with the procedural informality" of arbitration).
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fees dwarf the amount at stake in the dispute or substantially exceed the cost of
judicial proceedings. 1 8 Or they may require a party to travel to a venue so far
away that the costs of getting to the arbitral venue far exceed the damages at
stake. 119
These rules do not conflict with arbitration's fundamental values. If anything,
applying unconscionability or public policy doctrines to rein in such clauses when
they deny an individual the ability to seek relief reinforces the goal of reducing
costs and of providing an affordable alternative to litigation. 12 In Italian Colors,
the United States Supreme Court explicitly noted that a provision requiring the
plaintiff to pay costs and fees so high as to make the arbitral forum inaccessible
could still be a valid ground for invalidating an arbitration clause.121 Thus, the
FAA should not preempt state-law challenges to such provisions.
F. Confidentiality
Not every confidentiality provision in an arbitration clause is necessarily unconscionable. However, provisions requiring parties to keep information confidential can be struck down as unconscionable or against public policy when they
give one side an extremely unfair advantage. Confidentiality agreements threaten
to tilt the playing field by giving repeat players an information advantage and by
preventing the other party from obtaining information that would level it.122
Although many may instinctively associate arbitration with confidentiality,
forced secrecy is not a fundamental attribute of arbitration, and thus the FAA

118. See, e.g., Chavarria,733 F.3d at 925-26 (striking down provision requiring the parties to evenly
split arbitrators' fees where plaintiff showed that he would likely have to pay $3,500-$7,000 in fees, an
amount the court found "likely dwarfs the amount of Chavarria's claims"); Gandee, 293 P.3d at 1200
(holding an arbitration provision unconscionable because plaintiff met her burden of showing costs of
travel to a distant venue plus costs of the arbitrators' fees would exceed the damages at stake and her
ability to pay); Clark v. Renaissance W., LLC, 307 P.3d 77, 81-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding
arbitration provision requiring parties to split arbitrator fees unconscionable where plaintiff built a
detailed factual record showing that the costs of arbitrators, based on the estimated length of the hearing, made arbitration prohibitively expensive in light of plaintiffs limited and fixed income);
Potiyeviskiy v. TM Transp., Inc., No. 1-13-1864, 2013 IL App (1st) 131864-U, at *8 (Ill. Ct. App.
Nov. 25, 2013) (striking arbitration provision as unconscionable where the arbitrators' fees, which the
parties were required to split, would be at least $975 for claims that might be as small as $25); Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable where
the $2,660 arbitration filing fee was seven times greater than the filing fee in court and almost fifteen
times greater than the arbitration fee for employment disputes).
119. See, e.g., Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App'x 692 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding unconscionability in part because "the arbitration forum provision requires Newton, who resides in California, to arbitrate in Tulsa, Oklahoma Global Client Solutions' headquarters."); Potiyeviskiy, v. TM
Transp., Inc., No. 1-13-1864, 2013 IL App (1st) 131864-U, at *8 (Ill. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (holding
arbitration clause's choice of Illinois as a forum was not per se unconscionable, but that under the facts
of the case, "requiring the drivers to make repeated trips to Illinois from out of state to arbitrate numerous low-dollar-amount claims is [unconscionable].").
120. See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 202 (Cal. 2013) (giving example of
an arbitration clause requiring the plaintiff to pay $8,000 in fees, which was well beyond her ability to
pay, as an issue that has nothing to do with fundamental attributes of arbitration).
121. 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11; Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 926-27 (relying on Italian Colors in concluding
that the FAA did not preempt applying state unconscionability law to strike down a fee-sharing provision that made arbitration prohibitively expensive).
122. See, e.g., Chavarria,733 F.3d at 924.
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should not preempt state law challenges to confidentiality provisions."'2 Significantly, the Concepcion Court identified confidentiality not as an essential feature
of arbitration, but rather as one of the many optional features that, depending on
the nature of the relationship of the parties and the type of dispute involved, may
or may not be included in an arbitration provision.12 4 The Court noted that, under
the FAA, parties might specify, if they wish, "that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept confidential to protect trade
secrets. 125 Just as arbitrator specialization is an option, but not a fundamental
attribute of arbitration, so too is confidentiality.
The FAA's text and structure appear to support the conclusion that confidentiality is not a fundamental attribute of arbitration. The FAA appears to presume
that arbitration materials could become public, even if the arbitration provision
includes a forced confidentiality clause. The Act allows parties to go to court to
seek to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, and requires parties to file certain
documents when doing so.12 6 The information submitted in arbitration will likely
be relevant to that determination, and thus will become a public record as part of
the court proceeding, subject to any protective order that the trial court might impose.
It appears that empirical evidence also supports this result. 127 One review
found that arbitration communications are generally admissible in court and are
not automatically privileged. 128 This stands in contrast to mediation, which is
more protective of confidentiality. The Uniform Mediation Act, for example,
creates an evidentiary privilege against disclosure of mediation communications. 129 Thus, confidentiality is not an essential feature of arbitration.
G. Discovery Limitations
Not every provision that limits discovery in arbitration will be unconscionable. Parties are certainly entitled to agree to limit the amount of discovery that can
be conducted in arbitration. 130 As courts have held, provisions restricting discov-

123. See, e.g., Schnuerle v. Insight Commc'ns, Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 578 (Ky. 2012) (striking down
an arbitration clause's confidentiality provision where it gave the drafting party an unfair advantage
and concluding that Concepcion does not require upholding confidentiality provisions).
124. See Sura & DeRise, supra note 8, at 463 (noting that Concepcion identified confidentiality "as a
benefit that parties could choose for themselves").
125. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct 1740, 1749 (2011).
126. 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2012) (requiring the party seeking to confirm, vacate or modify an award to
submit various documents to the court including the arbitration agreement, the arbitration award, the
identities of the arbitrators, as well as notices and affidavits and other papers used in support of the
motion); see also Drahozal, supra note 9, at 167 (noting that "under U.S. law, the privacy of arbitration
does not extend to precluding a party's disclosure of the existence of the arbitration or even its outcome").
127. See Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration:Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1255, 1281 (2006) (suggesting that "confidentiality is not an essential characteristic of arbitration in
that a rule of evidentiary exclusion is not necessary to the functioning of arbitration as an adversarial
process").
128. See id. at 1273 (noting that "[t]he overwhelming majority of states do not have statutes or court
rules that generally preclude the admission of arbitration in formal legal proceedings").
129. Uniform Mediation Act, § 4, 7A U.L.A. 104, 122 (2003).
130. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (indicating that reduced discovery may be part of the tradeoff that comes with choosing arbitration over litigation).
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cry can be unconscionable and not preempted, when they are so limiting that they
preclude a party from pursuing relief.131
Intuitively, one might think that arbitration is designed to be a speedier and
more informal alternative to court, and thus that discovery should be limited. The
Concepcion Court provided the hypothetical example of a rule requiring judicially
monitored discovery in all disputes as an example of a generally applicable rule
that could be preempted by the FAA."' As explained above, the Court's hypothetical involved a categorical rule that would require extensive discovery in all
cases, regardless of whether the lack of discovery prevented the plaintiff from
raising a claim.133
By contrast, a fact-specific application of unconscionability principles to discovery limitations that prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a claim does not interfere
with any fundamental attribute of arbitration.13 4 Discovery is not inherently inconsistent with arbitration. Rather, the FAA itself contemplates that parties to an
arbitration agreement would be permitted to conduct some fact gathering. For
example, Section 4 of the Act requires a court to hold a jury trial when there is a
dispute over whether an arbitration agreement has been validly formed.135 Once
the validity of the arbitration agreement is questioned, "[t]he FAA provides 1for
' 36
discovery and a full trial in connection with a motion to compel arbitration."
Similarly, once a dispute actually gets to arbitration, the FAA grants the arbitrator
power to develop evidence, including the power to subpoena witnesses and to
require witnesses to bring "any book, record, document, or paper which may be
deemed material as evidence in the case. 137 Thus, the FAA itself indicates arbi131. See, e.g., Winston v. Academi Training Center, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-767, 2013 WL 989999, at *2
(E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2013) (holding arbitration clause prohibiting any discovery in arbitration precluded
plaintiff from vindicating federal statutory rights when applied to plaintiffs False Claims Act (FCA)
claim because "FCA claims are often document intensive," making it "difficult, if not impossible, to
prove those claims" without access to the allegedly falsified documents that form the basis of the
claim); Unimax Express, Inc. v. Cosco N. Am., Inc., No. CV-11-02947-DDP (PLAx), 2011 WL
5909881, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011) (holding an arbitration clause substantively unconscionable
when it did not allow party bringing a claim any right to discovery in order to rebut the opposing
party's response); see also Zaborowski v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1154 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (holding that, although a discovery limitation could be unconscionable if it precluded plaintiffs from having a realistic opportunity to pursue their claims, the plaintiffs in this case failed to meet
their burden); but cf Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 2012 WL 5199384, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2012) (questioning whether rules regulating limits on discovery in arbitration survive Concepcion); Tierra Right of
Way Servs., Ltd. v. Abengoa Solar Inc., 2012 WL 2292007, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2011) (enforcing
blanket discovery prohibition against unconscionability challenge where party asserting unconscionability failed to "allege how an inability to conduct discovery or demand production of documents will
render it incapable of presenting and proving its case, particularly when its similarly situated corporate
opponent also is so limited."). Numerous courts have permitted parties to take discovery regarding the
validity of an arbitration clause. See F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS: ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER Topics, § 2.4.2 (NCLC 6th ed. 2011).
132. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct 1740, 1747 (2011).
133. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
134. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (noting that the arbitration regime at issue provided for some discovery in determining that the plaintiff would be able to pursue his claim in arbitration).
135. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
136. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1999).
137. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), which is a model for many
state arbitration statutes, also authorizes arbitrators to subpoena witnesses and order discovery. Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, § 17, 7 U.L.A. § 61. Moreover, the RUAA's provisions permitting
arbitrators to issue subpoenas and order depositions are non-waivable, meaning that the parties cannot
limit the arbitrator's discovery authority by contract. Id., § 17(a)-(b).
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tration does not necessarily require that parties cannot conduct any discovery, or
can only conduct limited discovery.
Second, the assumption that arbitration is synonymous with limited discovery
is incorrect. Studies of contemporary arbitration provisions indicate that "pro-

ceedings under standard arbitration rules are likely to include prehearing motion
practice and extensive discovery," and that "[a]rbitration proceedings are now
often preceded by extensive discovery, including depositions."138 The fact that
sophisticated parties in particular are increasingly choosing to include discovery
as a component of their arbitration regimes reinforces the point that limiting or
prohibiting discovery is not a fundamental component of arbitration.
H. ArbitratorSelection
Many courts have found that provisions establishing biased or partial pro-

cesses for arbitrator selection can be struck down as139
unconscionable or against
140

As explained above,
public policy without giving rise to FAA preemption.
regulating against arbitrator bias does not interfere with the FAA. Rather, it is
fully consistent with the FAA,
which itself permits invalidation of an arbitration
41
award on the ground of bias.

IV. WHAT IS FUNDAMENTAL To ARBITRATION?
Concepcion directs us to think about what it is that truly is "fundamental" to
arbitration. Doing so shows that when carefully read, Concepcion might significantly limit FAA preemption instead of expanding it. What the above discussion
suggests is that, perhaps with the exception of the absence of class proceedings,

there is no particular procedure, rule, device, or structure that is an essential or
necessary part of arbitration. Rather, society's idealized notion of what arbitration
looks like-speedy, informal, less costly-is not an accurate reflection of what
138. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "'New Litigation", 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6, 13
(2010); see also Lawrence W. Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the Predictabilityof Procedures,
113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2009) (noting that business arbitration "has become more similar to
litigation particularly U.S.-style litigation in United States courts in large part because of increased
procedural activity, including discovery").
139. See, e.g., Brown v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948, 957 (Wash. 2013) (provision allowing
one party to select pool of three arbitrators was "overly harsh and one-sided" and thus unconscionable); Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2013) (striking down provision
that effectively ensured drafting party would be able to choose the arbitrator); Newton v. Am. Debt
Servs., Inc., 549 F. App'x 692 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable in part because "the arbitration agreement reserves the selection of an arbitrator solely to defendants"); Zaborowski v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding arbitration
provision unconscionable where the provision gave drafting party unilateral control over pool of arbitrators).
140. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
141. In addition, courts have rejected preemption arguments related to various other types of rules
when applied to arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 843
N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 2014) (holding provision of Iowa Civil Rights Act permitting Iowa Civil Rights
Commission to bring enforcement actions against employers was not preempted by the FAA when the
Commission brought an enforcement action in court on behalf of an individual who signed an arbitration provision); Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013) (holding the FAA did
not necessarily preempt application of state law unconscionability principles to invalidate arbitration
clause that prevents a party from pursuing administrative remedy prior to arbitration).
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actually takes
place in arbitration or of what Congress envisioned when enacting
142

the FAA.

Arbitration "is not a monolith." 143 It takes all shapes and sizes, and in many
cases looks precisely the opposite of our mythologized view.144 Although we think
of arbitration as informal, it is common for arbitration provisions to include "triallike procedures for discovery," and to incorporate judicial litigation rules including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 45 Although we think of arbitration as

cost-effective, it often ends up being as expensive or more expensive than litigation, especially when accounting for the fact that parties must pay the cost of the
arbitrators themselves.1 46 Ironically, the limits on collective, consolidated or other
multi-party proceedings that Concepcion authorized have resulted, at least in

business arbitrations, in greater costs and inefficiencies by requiring multiple arbitrations rather than a single proceeding. 47 Although we often think of arbitration
as being speedy, the parties in many cases agree to procedures that make the proceedings end up being lengthier than court proceedings would, and some arbitrators may be less inclined than judges to use procedures like summary judgment to
resolve a case more quickly.1 48 Different arbitration agreements embed different
procedures. Some provisions require confidentiality, some do not; some limit
discovery, some do not; some call for truncated proceedings, some do not.
There is no one procedural device that is necessary for arbitration. In the
words of Professor Thomas Stipanowich, "[c]hoice is what sets arbitration apart
142. Some Justices have similarly criticized the Supreme Court's arbitration doctrine as having
"abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration
Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation." Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Sura & DeRise, supra note 8, at 425 ("Arbitration, like litigation, is not a monolith, and can vary
greatly depending on the nature of the dispute.").
144. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin and Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of
Employment ArbitrationSystem Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOL. 59, 80 (2014) ("It is
also striking the degree to which some of the structural features of the litigation system for how cases
proceed are replicated in arbitration.").
145. Stipanowich, supra note 138, at 13; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and the
Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 71, 81 (2014) (noting increased use of summary judgment procedures in employment arbitration, and suggesting "that the
differences from litigation in this area are diminishing").
146. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 133-144 (2004); PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID 7173#o (asserting that arbitration often is as costly or more costly than litigation); see also Benjamin J.C. Wolf, On-Line but Out of
Touch: Analyzing InternationalDispute Resolution Through the Lens of the Internet, 14 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 281, 306-07 (2006) (complaining that arbitration has become just as expensive as
litigation).
147. Stipanowich, supra note 138, at 22; see also Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1287-88
(D. Colo. 2011) (enforcing arbitration clause's class action waiver despite the fact that individualized
arbitrations would require the same witnesses to testify in 800 different individual proceedings rather
than in a single consolidated proceeding).
148. Stipanowich, supra note 138, at 15-16; Charles D. Coleman, Is Mandatory Employment Arbitration Living Up to Its Expectations?A View from the Employer's Perspective, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 227, 235-37 (2010) (indicating that in many disputes, particularly ones involving pro se litigants,
arbitration is likely to cost more and take longer than going to court); Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration
and the Third World: A Pleafor Reassessing Bias Under the Spector of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 419, 434-35 (2000) (arguing that international arbitration has become just as lengthy as
litigation and identifying the cause as the American arbitration model of including many of the procedural protections of litigation).
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from litigation,"'1 49 and that means freely-negotiated, real choice exercised by both
parties to the transaction. Unlike litigation which sets unwaivable default rules of
procedure, the parties in arbitration can themselves negotiate the particular facets
of the arbitration process that they think best fit their business relationship and the
types of disputes that are likely to arise. Parties can design streamlined arbitration
procedures aimed at reaching a quick result, or can design more extensive proceedings if they want to preserve various procedural protections-within the confines set by the FAA itself.150
Concepcion recognized the importance of true choice exercised by both parties. It described the FAA not as necessarily mandating speedy and cheap dispute
resolution, but rather as "affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes" to "allow for efficient streamlined proceedings tailored to the type of dispute. 151 In other words, different types of disputes may demand different types
of proceedings, and arbitration provides parties a real opportunity to negotiate and
choose those procedures that they believe align best with the dispute at issue."'
Notably, by referring to "parties" rather than "party," the Court indicated that all
parties would be able to play a role in designing the agreement, in contrast to the
situation where one party imposes arbitration terms on the other in a nonnegotiable, take-it-or-leave-it adhesion contract.
If arbitration is about preserving meaningful choice, then the characteristic
that conflicts with the "fundamental attributes" of arbitration is the absence of
choice-i.e. adhesion. Adhesion contracts, particularly in situations of unequal
bargaining power, reflect an absence of meaningful choice. Parties have little or
no opportunity to collectively design the terms of their arbitration process. Rather, one side imposes its arbitration process on the other. As the Sixth Circuit
recently recognized in addressing an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration
clause, "[t]he idea that the arbitration agreement in this case reflects the intent of
'
anyone but [the drafting party] is the purest legal fiction."153
This is not the
"choice" that the FAA's framers envisioned.
There is evidence that it is the adhesion regime of consumer and employment
arbitration provisions that is at odds with arbitration's fundamental nature. Several scholars have addressed how the FAA was intended for commercial transactions between sophisticated parties with roughly equal bargaining power rather
than for take-it-or-leave-it business-to-consumer transactions. 154 Other scholars
149. See Stipanowich, supra note 138, at 51; see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The FederalArbitration Act
as ProceduralReform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.(forthcoming 2014) (describing the prevailing view among
arbitration scholars that the goal of the FAA was to preserve private autonomy and choice). Choice
may not be the only attribute that is fundamental to arbitration some might argue that adjudication is
fundamental to arbitration, in the sense that a required adjudication sets arbitration apart from other
alternative dispute resolution processes, such as mediation or negotiation.
150. The parties' choice, however, is not unfettered under the FAA. For example, the FAA prohibits
the parties from contracting for greater judicial review than provided in the statute itself. See Hall St.
Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008).
151. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011).
152. Not everyone agrees that the essence of arbitration is choice. Some assert that the goal of the
FAA was not to preserve party choice, but that it was designed as a procedural reform during the era of
overly-technical litigation rules that predated the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Aragaki, supra note 149.
153. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 2013).
154. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking The Supreme Court's
Preferencefor Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 647 (1996) ("Most commentators have concluded
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have addressed how the FAA's enactors envisioned that public policy defenses
would be applied to arbitration clauses just as they are to other contracts.155
Similarly, scholars who examine comparative arbitration practices have noted
how the United States is "exceptional" and virtually unique in the way that it rigidly enforces forced arbitration agreements in adhesive contracts and limits156a
state's ability to regulate such agreements in order to protect the weaker party.
By contrast, "many other countries refuse or strictly limit arbitration enforcement
in Business-to-Consumer (B2C) relationships, due to concerns regarding power
imbalances and public enforcement of consumer protections." ' Several European countries and the European Union have placed significant restrictions on the
enforcement of arbitration clauses in B2C contracts because of the imbalance of
bargaining power and ensuing risk of unfairness.158 That the United States stands
alone in its treatment of adhesive arbitration agreements reinforces that the absence of real choice is what is inconsistent with arbitration.
As a result, Concepcion suggests the FAA does not preempt state regulation
of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts. If adhesion contracts are anathema to
the fundamental attributes of arbitration, and if interference with arbitration's
fundamental attributes triggers FAA preemption, then regulation of adhesion contracts is not preempted by the FAA because it does not interfere with the FAA's
goal of protecting true choice on the part of all parties. If anything, interpreting
Concepcion in such a manner will promote private choice by allowing states to
look skeptically at arbitration agreements that deny choice, i.e., ones that are unilaterally imposed in contracts of adhesion. If courts interpret the FAA to give
states greater authority to regulate adhesive arbitration agreements than they previously had, that may encourage parties that wish to use arbitration agreements to
give contracting parties greater negotiating power over the arbitration provision's
terms.
Such an interpretation does not mean that forced arbitration provisions contained in adhesive contracts are never enforceable. It simply means that, under
Concepcion, states should be free to regulate adhesive arbitration provisions without interfering with the FAA. The one likely exception concerns adhesive class
action waivers. To be sure, the class action waiver that the Concepcion Court
found enforceable was contained in an adhesive arbitration agreement, but that has
to do with the unique concerns created by class arbitration. Classwide arbitration
can be viewed as inconsistent with free choice, regardless of whether it is contained in an adhesive or non-adhesive contract, by imposing an award or decision

that the FAA was envisioned as applying to consensual transactions between two merchants of roughly
equal bargaining power and not necessarily to transactions between a large merchant and a much
weaker and less knowledgeable consumer."); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To ProtectBig
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 75-81 (arguing that the framers intended the FAA to be limited to commercial disputes between business entities).
155. See Horton, supra note 8, at 1255-61 (explaining how public policy was a common contract
defense at the time of the FAA's enactment, and that members of Congress would have understood it
as a general contract doctrine applicable to contracts for arbitration).
156. See Amy J. Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in Consumer Arbitration, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L
L. REV. 81, 82 (2012).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 94-99 (describing different approaches).
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on absent parties who did not choose to be part of the proceeding.15 9 Thus, even
though Concepcion arose from an adhesion contract, its reasoning is consistent
with the notion that the FAA ordinarily does not preempt regulation of adhesion
contracts. The FAA only bars states from regulating away the fundamental aspects of arbitration.
Moreover, giving states authority to regulate arbitration provisions that are
part of adhesive contracts does not mean that states lack authority to regulate arbitration in non-adhesive, freely-negotiated contracts. Such contracts are still governed by generally applicable contract principles in the same way as any other
non-adhesive contract. The FAA's savings clause makes it clear that any arbitration clause, adhesive or non-adhesive, can be invalidated "upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 16 Because adhesive
contracts fall outside the sphere of what the FAA seeks to protect, regulation of
adhesive contracts does not necessarily interfere with the FAA and should not be
preempted by it. 161
CONCLUSION
Despite concern that the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Concepcion and
Italian Colors dramatically altered the arbitration landscape, a close reading of
those cases suggests a different conclusion. While Concepcion's focus on protecting arbitration's "fundamental attributes" from state regulation may exert a significant effect on unconscionability challenges to class action waivers in arbitration
clauses, in reality it should have little effect on fact-specific applications of general contract doctrines, like unconscionability, to arbitration agreements that are so
unfair as to prevent a party from pursuing his or her rights. Moreover, examination of arbitration's "fundamental attributes" reveals that the characteristic most
inconsistent with arbitration is not any particular procedure or rule, but adhesive
agreements that deny parties a voice in designing the terms and conditions of arbitration. Concepcion thus enables us to re-examine what is and is not fundamental
to arbitration and, when fairly read, authorizes state courts and legislatures to regulate adhesive agreements in a way that preserves choice instead of taking it away.

159. See Aragaki, supra note 149 (arguing that the Concepcion's Court's problem with classwide
arbitration was that it "effectively imposed class arbitration on parties who did not consent to it"); see
also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010) (explaining how class
arbitration fundamentally changes arbitration, in part because "[t]he arbitrator's award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent
parties as well").
160. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
161. That states are free to regulate arbitration provisions contained in contracts of adhesion does not
mean that states lack power to regulate arbitration in non-adhesive, freely-negotiated contracts. Such
contracts are still governed by generally applicable contract principles in the same way that any other
non-adhesive contract is. The FAA's savings clause makes it clear that any arbitration clause, adhesive or non-adhesive, can be invalidated "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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